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PAFTA or the alternative of closer economic cooperation. Their major interests differ widely from those of Europeans. The Pacific basin region has a huge potential for trade growth and development which should be cultivated through coordinated efforts. Countries belonging to this region have already given recognition to the two common aims of promoting freer trade growth among the Pacific advanced countries and neighbouring less developed countries. Regional solidarity by measures for supporting the dollar, so that American economic potential can excercise a more positive role, is urgently required. Solidarity in the political and military objectives of these countries could also be developed further.
The establishment of a Pacific Free Trade Area is, however, still only an idea that needs implementation. Therefore the suggestion of bilateral government-to-government consultations and negotiations within the framework of an Organisation for Pacific Trade Aid and Development (OPTAD) 5 would appear sound. The OPTAD could be developed along similar lines to OECD, that is, not as a regulatory agency but as a place where government-to-government consultations could take place. Although this is already a function of OECD, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada thus could obtain considerable advantages in having a smaller scale regional organisation to deal with problems of a more regional nature.' It is also desirable to establish a Pacific Policy Committee to study and promote practical means of achieving these objectives.' 
Focal Points of Chinese Economic Aid
by Volker Bethke, Hamburg * Reviewing the evolution of Chinese economic aid, it can be found that the People's Republic, though labouring under relatively adverse conditions, has proved its mettle In this field by actively supporting less developed countries (LDCs) over many years.
E
ven though there is a deplorable lack of sufficient statistical returns about the overall extent of Chinese aid, we can find certain points of reference that permit us to draw conclusions about the volume of Chinese economic assistance. Quantification of credits promised to countries outside the Eastern Bloc does not present insurmountable obstacles. Reviewing figures and data from different sources over longer periods, we find that, though promised credits were unevenly distributed over individual years, comparable estimates can be worked out. These data refer exclusively to economic aid, but exclude military aid, though a precise separation of the two is not always possible.
Chinese economic aid went through its initial phase from 1956 to 1960, and during this period, annual averages of promised credits remained below $ 40 mn. In 1961-65, the corresponding amount rose to about $130 mn, and in 1966-70 to either $150 or up to 190 mn, depending on which kind of source is used by the researcher 1. However,
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there is general agreement that the total for 1970 aFone grew to over $ 700 mn of promised credits, both the US administration and the United Nations estimating that Chinese economic aid commitments, in 1970, surpassed that of the Soviet Union. This comparison, nevertheless, makes it possible only to draw limited conclusions regarding the overall volume and the efficiency of Chinese economic assistance. China's aid is fundamentally different from that offered by other countries for two reasons: credits are granted under easier conditions, and costs caused by carrying out projects financed by China are much lower, especially staffing costs.
Projects Supported by Chinese Aid
However, Chinese economic aid is characterised not only by favourable conditions but also by the focal points where support is given to development projects. The most spectacular of these projects is the construction of a railway line, about 1,160 miles long, leading from the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambian railhead of Kapiri Mooshi. It was this public works undertaking Even though the railway project in Tanzania and Zambia claimed more than 50 p.c. of all Chinese credits promised during 1970, 175 other projects had been completed with Chinese assistance up to 1971. These small and medium-scale projects which, in general, were drawn up in conformity with the development levels already reached by recipient countries and were integrated in existing national development plans, have been widely spread over the fields of light industries, farming, local crafts, energy generation, transport and medical aid.
Regional Distribution
During the fifties and sixties, the Soviet Union and the USA were engaged in political confrontation throughout the world. This had the effect that, inspite of active striving for neutrality, the LDCs often became involved in the struggle. But whilst this process of polarisation was in train, China was also able to increase its development activities. The Chinese found sufficient changes to chip in with their economic aid, though points of departure for their assistance were very differently situated in different regions.
In many cases, especially in Asia, they were compelled simply to react to aid programmes already initiated by the USA or the Soviet Union, whereas in other areas, especially in Africa, there was still a wide field open for their development activities, without their having to risk immediate confrontation with either one of them. In the first half of the sixties, demarcation lines between opposite spheres of influence were strong in the Middle East, and this meant that there remained hardly a gap for China to slip through. And in Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, the hegemony of Western industrialised countries, especially that of the USA, remained so overwhelming up to quite recently that there was hardly a chance for cooperation left to the Chinese.
Asia --Focus of Chinese Aid?
Of a total over $ 2 bn of credits promised to 26 countries, the lion's share of 44 p.c. was claimed by seven Asian countries. Today, however, only two of them -Pakistan and Ceylon -receive official Chinese assistance. Over two thirds of originally promised credits were for Pakistan and Indonesia. But these two states must be considered to have been special cases of Chinese aid, though for different reasons.
Pakistan began to draw Chinese support in 1964. Long before 1971, the country received special treatment because of the impending war between India and Pakistan. Developments expected before China's own door, when India made its cooperation with the Soviet Union progressively closer, caused China to plunge for an exceptionally strong engagement in Pakistan which, expressed in financial terms, had added up by 1971 to a total of $ 352 mn in promised credits. Promises that were made to Indonesia originated all in the period before 1966, when the former Indonesian president, Dr Soekarno, pursued his brand of national independence policy, with full Chinese approval. In 1965 alone, immediately before Soekarno's fall, $ 200 mn were granted, but this total was never fully drawn upon. Assistance for Indonesia, therefore, has become a purely hypothetical figure today.
Aid for the remaining Asian nations, which, except for Ceylon and Cambodia, are situated contiguous to China's own frontiers, has remained within the framework of credit promises which were made to other countries, too. It would therefore not be justified to say that China -apart from Paktistan's case -tries to build up specially strong influences in the Asian region through its economic aid today. 
Exemplary Economic Aid In Africa
Far out in front are Tanzania and Zambia, but neglecting the railway credits promised in 1970 for the first construction stage of that project, we find that also Tanzania and Zambia, measured by their shares in the remaining credit volume, have no special rank among the other African countries. Disregarding the Central African Republic and Mauritania, the scale of credit promises ranges from individual amounts of $ 15 to 70 mn. After the Central African Republic had been promised a credit of $ 3 mn in 1965, it broke off relations with China, so that economic aid could not be extended further. Mauritania, up to now, received only $ 7 mn, but it will move up to the average level short[y because China is planning its second giant project of development aid on the coast of West Africa. There, credits on favourable conditions and the help of Chinese technicians will lead to the construction of an ocean port for ships of more than 50 000 Gross Register Tons -larger than the ports of Abidjan and Dakar, and therefore the largest port facility on the whole West African coast.
Large projects like these either already in hand or planned, and the continuous character of Chinese aid, make it clear that Africa is now, and will be in future, the main recipient of Chinese economic assistance. Whilst official aid for Asian countries, except for Pakistan and Ceylon, has dried up, of the 13 African states originally chosen for Chinese aid, 10 are still receiving active assistance. Relations with both Ghana and the Central African Republic were broken off in 1966, shortly after the start of Chinese aid. Relations with Kenya were put in cold storage already in 1965. In 1971, initial contacts with Kenia were resumed by the Chinese Red Cross making a donation on the occasion of a disastrous drought.
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To sum up, it may be stated that Chinese economic support for African states is directed far less against attempts of the Soviet Union and the USA to maintain and expand their influence than in other parts of the world. The reason seems to be partly that both these countries have not drawn the borders of their spheres of influence as clearly and rigidly here as they did, for example, in Asia or the Middle East. In these regions, the Chinese People's Republic is compelled to react with its development policy to the super-powers' prevailing interests, whilst on the continent of Africa, there is much wider scope for the Chinese to act independently with their development policies. That means that the directions in which this policy may strike out are not primarily predetermined by earlier steps taken by others, but by the recipient countries' own interests. China is likely to make use of these special African conditions also in the future, by gaining, through a model development policy, more good will and confidence in the countries of the Third World.
Cool Relations with the Middle East
In contrast with the foregoing, the points of copper. This is intended to make China, after the USA and the UK, Chile's third-most important customer. It can only be a question of time before an agreement about Chinese economic aid for Chile will be signed.
Chinese advances into the American sub-continent, which have very recently begun, reveal clearly that the political self-denying ordinance practised by China in Africa is not identical with undifferentiated randomness in selecting China's partners. Here again, and in Latin America more so than elsewhere, China will have to practise severe reticence in trying of influence policies of national and socialist forces that are active in these countries, for it is just those Latin American Republics where China could make a start in cultivating improved mutual relations that have ample experience in fighting US interest, and that imbues them with a large measure of self-confidence.
If development cooperation all over the world, which is still in its very first stages, is to be crowned with eventual success, the Chinese People's Republic will have to act according to its own maxim, that was founded on its own experiences: "In order to achieve their complete liberation, oppressed peoples have to rely, in the first instance, on their own struggle, and only in the second instance, on international help." (Mao Tsetung).
